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The law and the economy are deeply influenced by the legal tra-
dition or origin, which is the bundle of institutions shaping law-
making and dispute adjudication. The two principal legal tradi-
tions, common law and civil law, have been transplanted through
colonization and occupation to the vast majority of the jurisdic-
tions in the world by a group of European countries. Here, I illus-
trate a novel dataset recording the lawmaking institution
employed by 155 of these jurisdictions at independence and in
2000 and four discretion-curbing adjudication institutions adop-
ted by 99 of these “transplants” at the same two points in time.
Contrary to the “legal origins” scholars' assumption, 25 transplants
changed the transplanted lawmaking institution and 95 modified
at least one of the transplanted lawmaking and adjudication rules.
In “Endogenous Legal Traditions” (Guerriero, 2016a) [12], I docu-
ment that these reforms are consistent with a model of the design
of legal institutions by societies heterogeneous in their endow-
ment of both the extent of cultural heterogeneity and the quality of
the political process. In “Endogenous Legal Traditions and Eco-
nomic Outcomes” (Guerriero, 2016b) [13] moreover, I show the
relevance of considering legal evolution and the endogeneity
between legal traditions and economics outcomes. The data illu-
strated here also include the proxies for the determinants of legal











C. Guerriero / Data in Brief 8 (2016) 394–398 3952016a) [12] and the novel measure of economic outcomes I employ
in “Endogenous Legal Traditions and Economic Outcomes” (Guer-
riero, 2016b) [13].
& 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open
access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).Specifications Tableubject area Economics.
ore specific sub-
ject areaLaw and Economics; Institutional Economics.ype of data Excel, PDF
ow data was
acquiredCodifying the measures of legal institutions starting from the history of each
country legal order and collecting the other data from primary sources.ata format Raw, processed
xperimental
factorsCountries with incomplete data have been discarded; legal institutions have
been measured with dummies and discrete indices; the measure of legal tradi-
tions in 2000 employed in [13] as well as the other reported variables are
continuous.xperimental
featuresLegal institutions are measured for the year of independence and 2000; all the
other variables are measured at different points in time preceding 2000.ata source
location155 countries that received their initial legal tradition externally.ata accessibility Data are with this article.Value of the data
 The data reveal that legal traditions are not fixed in the original transplanted form as assumed by
the legal origins scholars [14], but they evolve. Hence, more theoretical and empirical research on
the determinants of this evolution, as in [12], is necessary.
 The data allow to study the impact of endogenous legal traditions on the economy as in [13].
 The data are key to draw policy implications relevant for the current process of international legal
harmonization.1. Data
The dataset consists of cross-sectional observations on 155 countries that received their initial
legal tradition exogenously mainly via colonization or occupation, i.e., transplants. For this sample, I
report in the excel file “OIL_W” the lawmaking and adjudication institutions at independence and in
2000, the proxies for the determinants of their evolution I discuss in [12], and both the continuous
measure of legal traditions and a measure of social welfare I employ in [13]. While the lawmaking
institution determines the identity of the lawmaker – i.e., the government, the legislature, or the
president under statute law and appellate judges under case law, adjudication institutions modulate
the discretion allowed by the legal system to lower adjudicating courts [5,10,20,22]. The drivers of the
evolution of legal traditions are the extent of cultural diversity and the quality of the political process.
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2.1. Legal traditions
The sources I use to code lawmaking institutions and identify the transplanted adjudication
institutions are the first volume of the International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law [8] and the
appendix accompanying [9], i.e., [1]. They illustrate in sufficient details the history of the legal order
of the 155 transplants for which I also observe cultural diversity and/or the quality of political
institutions. I exclude from this group Andorra, Guinea-Bissau, Mongolia, Mozambique, Netherlands
Antilles, San Marino, and Suriname lacking sufficient information and Afghanistan, Austria, Bhutan,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iraq, Maldives, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Soviet Union, Sweden, Switzerland,
and the United Kingdom because origins, i.e., they developed their legal tradition internally. [3] treat
also Finland, Norway, and the USA as origins but acknowledge that they could also be considered
transplants [3, pp. 186–187]. I follow this second view since the post-independence legal systems of
these countries were designed by Swedish, Danish, and English lawyers to resemble those of their
native countries [8, p. F-39, N-76, and U-141]. The case of the Soviet Union was instead more
autonomous and shaped by the desire to implement the Marxist ideal of a stable and certain legal
order [8, p. U-26].
At each point in time, the lawmaking institution is either case law or statute law. To illustrate, the
dummy Case equals one if the transplant used case law in 2000, i.e., if the decisions of a subset of
appellate courts, but not just those of the Constitutional one, were considered a source of private law
and treated as binding for future rulings by lower courts in 2000. Similarly, I define the dummy Case-I
for the independence year. In the cases of multiple transplantations – e.g., Grenada, Israel, Rwanda, St.
Vincent, Swaziland, Tunisia, and the ex-Eastern Bloc countries, I always focus on the most recent
episode determining legal institutions at independence. To illustrate, in cases like Bulgaria and
Romania, the most recent transplantation episode did not modify the legal institutions in place,
which thus survived after independence [1, p. 107 and p. 660]. The dummy Statute turns on when
Case equals 0 and the dummy Statute-I equals 1 when Case-I is 0. I treat Denmark, Germany, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom as exporters of case law. This choice is consistent with a legacy
of comparative law [5,10,20,22]. All in all, 10 transplants switched from statute law to case law, 15
abandoned case law to embrace statute law, 69 kept statute law, and the remainder maintained
case law.
For 99 of the aforementioned 155 transplants, [9] analyze the procedural rules governing the
adjudication of two ubiquitous legal disputes: the collection of a bounced check and the eviction of a
non-paying tenant. From this information, I obtain four variables measured in the year 2000: 1.
Comprehensive-Appeal, which is one if issues of both law and fact can be reviewed in appeal and zero
if only new evidence or issues of law can be reviewed, or if there is no appeal; 2. Judgment-Law, which
is one if judgments must be on law only, and zero when they may be based on equity grounds; 3.
Inquisitorial, which is 1 if judges can request or take evidence that has not been introduced by the
parties and can refuse to collect or admit requested evidence, 0.5 if they have only one of the two
prerogatives, and 0 otherwise; 4.Written-Evidence, which is one if the evidence is mostly submitted to
the court in written form and zero otherwise. An important body of comparative law claims that all
four variables equal one in a pure civil law jurisdiction and zero in a pure common law legal system
[15, p. 52, pp. 123–127; 22, p. 272].
To measure the evolution of legal traditions, I operate as follows. First, for each adjudication
institution I stack one over the other the values for the collection of a bounced check and the eviction
of a non-paying tenant. Second, I build on [5,7,10,20], and [22], and I obtain for the 99 transplants the
four adjudication institutions at independence, i.e., Comprehensive-Appeal-I, Judgment-Law-I,
Inquisitorial-I, and Written-Evidence-I. The United Kingdom and France transplanted respectively a
pure common law and a pure civil law tradition, whereas Austria and the Soviet Union (Denmark,
Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland) exported statute (case) law together with an intermediate level
of discretion in adjudication. Finally, I construct: 1. Common, which is the sum of Comprehensive-
Appeal-I, Judgment-Law-I, Inquisitorial-I, Written-Evidence-I, and Statute-I minus the sum of
Comprehensive-Appeal, Judgment-Law, Inquisitorial, Written-Evidence, and Statute in the sample of
C. Guerriero / Data in Brief 8 (2016) 394–398 397transplants that received statute law; 2. Civil, which is the sum of Comprehensive-Appeal, Judgment-
Law, Inquisitorial, Written-Evidence, and Statute minus the sum of Comprehensive-Appeal-I, Judgment-
Law-I, Inquisitorial-I, Written-Evidence-I, and Statute-I in the sample of transplants that received case
law. Thus, positive values of Common (Civil) correspond to a move toward a pure common (civil) law
tradition with higher values implying deeper reforms. Estimating through a two-parameter logistic
item response model the factor loadings of the five institutions characterizing a legal tradition reveals
that they do not differ significantly from one whether measured at independence or in 2000, and thus
they are equally important in capturing the latent “legal tradition” construct [18]. In [12], I also
propose two alternative measures of the evolution of legal traditions: the dummy Common-D (Civil-
D), which equals one when Common (Civil) is strictly greater than one, i.e., when relative to the bundle
prevailing at independence at least one more institution typical of the pure common (civil) law
tradition has been embraced. The pdf file “Measuring_LT” reports all the details of the codification
exercise just explained.
In [13], I proxy the extent to which a transplant was nearer to a pure common law tradition in
2000 through the variable Common-Law, which is the first principal component normalized in order
to range between 0 and 1 and extracted from Case-Law and 1 minus each of the following four
aforementioned indicators for the eviction of a non-paying tenant, i.e., Comprehensive-Appeal,
Judgment-Law, Inquisitorial, and Written. This choice is justified by the aforementioned evidence from
two-parameter logistic item response model estimates [18].
2.2. Drivers of the evolution of legal traditions
In [12], I use two proxies for cultural heterogeneity. While one measures the cultural diversity in
the transplant, the other gauges the cultural distance between the plurality ethnic group in the
country that chose the legal tradition and the plurality ethnic group in the transplant. Cavalli-Sforza
(1994) [6] suggest that the coancestry coefficient is an appropriate measure of the cultural distance
between populations since it summarizes “the degree of genealogical relatedness of different
populations over time. Thus, it can be interpreted as a general metrics for average differences in
characteristics transmitted across generations” [19, p. 473] like preferences for punishment. When
two populations split apart, their genes start to change due to random genetic drift, natural selection,
and migration. The coancestry coefficient is the sum of the random drift-driven differences in the
frequencies of DNA polymorphisms – i.e., situations in which a DNA sequence exists in at least two
different alleles – between indigenous populations in place before 1500. Since [6] calculate the
coancestry coefficient for macro-populations, I embrace the strategy proposed by Spolaore (2009)
[19]. First, I identify the plurality ethnic group in each country by using ethnic composition data from
[2] and information from [4]. Next, I match the plurality ethnic groups to the macro-populations
reported in [6]. Finally, I normalize the resulting coancestry coefficients to make them range between
0 and 1, i.e., Genetic-Distance. Larger values of Genetic-Distance reveal a longer separation and, in turn,
a larger cultural distance between populations. Cavalli-Sforza (1994) [6] also highlight the strong link
between genetic pools and ethnolinguistic roots. This relationship, which is driven by the diverse
cultural transmission instruments of populations that are increasingly distant from the common
ancestors, makes the ethnolinguistic fractionalization in a country a natural proxy for the “within”
cultural diversity. The measure of ethnolinguistic fractionalization ELF can be interpreted as the
probability that two individuals randomly drawn from the population belong to different ethno-
linguistic groups. ELF is based on data from the Narodov Mira atlas and [11]. Lower ethnolinguistic
cohesion corresponds to higher values of ELF, and therefore a value of 0 (1) identifies a completely
homogeneous (heterogeneous) country. In [12], I also experiment with the natural logarithm of the
number of languages [16] and the ethnic fractionalization [2].
Following [17], in [12] I proxy the quality of the political process with the normalized – to range
between 0 and 1 – first principal component extracted from the constraints on the executive
authority score and Polity score collected from the POLITY IV dataset at http://www.systemicpeace.
org/polity/ and averaged between independence and 2000, Pc-Institutions.
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In [13], I construct a proxy capturing simultaneously the long-run technological efficiency of the
law and society's cultural satisfaction with legal rules building on data from the World Business
Environment Survey [21]. This firm-level survey asked in 2000 managers to rate on a 6-point scale
how much they believe the legal system will uphold contracts and property rights in a business
dispute and how much they believe it is “fair and impartial.” While the former aspect relates to the
ability of the legal system to hit its efficiency targets – i.e., expanding trade and sheltering private
investment from expropriation, the latter substantiates society's cultural satisfaction with the law. To
capture both aspects, I consider the normalized first principal component extracted from the country
average of each question, i.e., Social-Welfare.Acknowledgments
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